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Introduction
One of the most debated issue in environmental and resource economics is the joint exploitation of common pool resources and the related tragedy of commons. 1 Some recent extensions of the literature on this matter examines the exploitation of a renewable resource in di¤erential oligopoly games with pro…t-seeking …rms, i.e., pure entrepreneurial units (Benchekroun, 2003 (Benchekroun, , 2008 Fujiwara, 2008 Fujiwara, , 2011 Labrecciosa, 2013, 2015 ; and Lambertini and Mantovani, 2014). However, casual observation reveals that in many industries, most of the …rms (in particular large ones) are indeed managerial entities in which control is separate from ownership and managers in charge of determining their respective …rms'strategies receive remunerations based on combinations of pro…ts and some other magnitudes, such as sales, revenues or market shares.
Most of the extant literature on strategic delegation (based on Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; and Fershtman, Judd and Kalai, 1991) neatly points out that delegation relying on contracts based on sales or revenues favours output expansion on the part of managers, thereby making …rms more aggressive as compared to what they would be if directly led by shareholders. This, in turn, produces a more competitive outcome 1 See the seminal contributions by Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) . The subsequent literature includes, among many others, Levhari and Mirman (1980) , Clemhout and Wan (1985) , Clark (1990) , Benhabib and Radner (1992) , Dockner and Sorger (1996) , Dawid and Kopel (1997) , Sorger (1998) and Benchekroun and Long (2002) , among many others.
Advanced overviews of the early stages of this debate are in Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and Clark (1990) . A recent survey of di¤erential games of resource extraction is in Lambertini (2013, ch. 9).
2 with a lower price and a higher industry output. These results, attained in static models, are con…rmed by the dynamic version of such games, as in Cellini and Lambertini (2008) . One notable exception is Ritz (2008) , in which the manager's remuneration is a combination of pro…ts and market
share. In such a case, the outcome is less competitive than that generated by entrepreneurial …rms, all else equal. Hence, there is no a priori presumption that the bearings of separation between ownership and control will be univocal, when the preservation of a natural resource is at stake.
To examine this issue, I am proposing an extension of the di¤erential oligopoly game investigated by Benchekroun (2003 Benchekroun ( , 2008 , Fujwara (2008) and Lambertini and Mantovani (2014) to account for two types of delegation contract, one based on sales, the other based on market shares. After outlining the quasi-static outcome generated under open-loop rules, I will set out to consider feedback ones. Given the nonlinear nature of the managerial incentive scheme using market shares, I will consider nonlinear feedback rules only.
The main results of the analysis can be summarised in the following terms.
Under open-loop information, delegation increases the residual resource stock surviving at the steady state equilibrium, irrespective of whether the contracts use sales or market shares. Instead, under nonlinear feedback rules, the impact of delegation on the residual stock strictly depends on the speci…cation of the contract. because of the resulting hastening of the extraction activity on the part of …rms, combined with the usual pre-emption e¤ect associated with feedback rules, whose presence has been abundantly stressed in previous research on di¤erential oligopoly games (see Fershtman and Kamien, 1987; and Reynolds, 1987) . Therefore, the use of market share incentives exerts a ‡ywheel e¤ect in combination with the voracity e¤ect in compromising resource preservation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
The model
The setup is an extension of Lambertini and Mantovani (2014) and Benchekroun Firms operate without any …xed costs. During production, each …rm exploits a renewable natural resource, whose accumulation is governed by the following dynamics:
with
where S is the resource stock, > 0 is its implicit growth rate when the stock is at most equal to S y and S y is the maximum sustainable yield. Taken together, (1-2) imply that (i) if the resource stock is su¢ ciently small the population grows at an exponential rate; and (ii) beyond S y , the asset grows at a decreasing rate. Moreover, S max is the carrying capacity of the habitat, beyond which the growth rate of the resource is negative, being limited by available amounts of food and space. In the remainder, we will con…ne our attention to the case in which F (S) = S.
Firms play noncooperatively and choose their respective outputs simultaneously at every instant. At t = 0; each …rm hires a manager whose contract speci…es the instantaneous objective which the manager has to maximise.
Contracts are observable. I will consider here two alternatives:
Type-I contract. As in Vickers (1985) , the instantaneous objective function of manager i is a linear combination of pro…ts and output:
In the remainder, I will treat as a constant for the sake of simplicity. It is worth noting that this type of contract implies that, through delegation, the owners intend to a¤ect the manager's perception of marginal cost, inducing the latter to act as if his …rm's marginal cost were indeed lower than c. To appreciate how this sort of technological illusion operates, it su¢ ces to observe that (3) can be rewritten as follows:
where b c = c . Hence, one could say that the manager behave as if he were maximising the pro…t
to a …rm endowed with a more e¢ cient technology. In a similar way, one could say that any > 0 induces the manager to behave as if the reservation price were higher than it actually is, say, A = a + : Be that as it may, this contract induces the output expansion constituting the core of Vicker's model of strategic delegation.
Type-II contract. As in Ritz (2008) , the instantaneous objective function of manager i is a linear combination of pro…ts and market share:
Also in this case, I will treat as a constant. Here, however, does not simply modify the manager's perception of marginal production cost, because of the nonlinear form of the delegation contract.
the maximand is a weighted average of pro…ts and revenues, 
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In either setting, the i-th manager maximises the following discounted
under the constraint posed by the state equation
Parameter r > 0 is the discount rate, common to all managers and constant over time. Obviously, if = = 0; …rms are pure pro…t-seeking entrepreneurial units and the two cases coincide.
The analysis will be carried out under the following assumption:
This guarantees the positivity of the residual resource stock at the steady state under feedback rules. That is, in the remainder I will leave the possibility of resource exhaustion due to an excessively large number of …rms out of the picture, in order to focus solely on the e¤ects of delegation. n (a c + ) (n + 1) ; n (a c) + q n 2 (a c) 2 + 4 (n 2 1) 2 (n + 1)
where
while the opposite applies outside this interval. Condition (8) su¢ ces to guarantee S > 0 at all times under the static Cournot-Nash strategies.
3 Open-loop equilibria 
Type-I contract
Under a delegation contract à la Vickers (1985) , the current-value Hamiltonian of …rm i is:
where a c + > 0 denotes the measure of market size as perceived by the manager of …rm i.
The necessary conditions (FOCs) are:
where Q i P j6 =i q j , and the adjoint equation reads as follows:
which reveals that i = 0 at all times is an admissible solution. This illustrates that …rms do not care about the consequences of their activities on the resource stock and behave in a quasi-static way all over the time horizon of the game, playing the optimal output associated with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CN ) at any time t; which can be directly obtained by imposing the symmetry condition q i = q for all i and then solve the FOC (11):
where subscript I indicates the structure of the delegation contract.
The resulting steady state stock is
Now observe that
This implies:
Lemma 1 Under a type-I contract and open-loop (quasi-static) rules, any
increase in the extent of delegation increases the residual stock of resources in steady state, all else equal.
Type-II contract
Assume now the contract o¤ered to managers is à la Ritz (2008) . If so, the
Hamiltonian of manager i looks as follows:
Once again, the game exhibits a linear state structure, and therefore the open-loop solution is subgame perfect. The necessary conditions (FOCs) are:
Using the same procedure as in the previous case, we may set i = 0; impose symmetry on output levels across the population of …rms and solve the …rst order condition to obtain:
everywhere. 5 The resulting steady state stock of the natural resource is
Once again, it is apparent that @S 
Type-I contract
This case can be quickly dealt with, as it is a relatively straightforward generalisation of the setup investigated in Lambertini and Mantovani (2014).
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation writes as:
where V i (S) is the …rm i's value function; and V
In view of the ex ante symmetry across …rms, we impose the condition q j = q i = q (S) and solve the FOC (22) to obtain V 0 (S) = a c + (n + 1)q (S) : Substituting this into (21) yields an identity in S. Di¤erentiating both sides with respect to S and rearranging terms, any feedback strategy is implicitly given by the following di¤erential equation:
which must hold together with terminal condition lim t!1 e rt V (s) = 0.
To characterise nonlinear feedback strategies one has to choose, in the space (S; q (S)) ; the speci…c solution identi…ed by the tangency point between the curve describing output q (S) and the line S = 0 (cf. Fujiwara, 2008, p.
218). As a …rst step, observe that, along S = 0; q (S) = =n; while at the tangency point, q 0 (S) = =n. Using this two expressions, (23) can be rewritten as follows: The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Lemma 3 Under a type-I delegation contract and nonlinear feedback rules, any increase in the extent of delegation increases the residual stock of resources in steady state, for all n > max f1; =rg.
So far, the analysis of the resource exploitation game seems to consistently con…rm that delegation is bene…cial in terms of the preservation of the resource itself in steady state, even considering strategies more sophisticated than those associated with open-loop information. This, however, is a deceptive impression generated by the simplistic delegation structure based on output expansion, as we are about to see by examining the incentive contract based on market shares. 6 Note that nr > (n + 1) r=2 for all n; r > 0. 7 The initial amount of resource must be lower than S N LF in order for q N LF to be an equilibrium strategy (see Itaya and Shimomura, 2001 ; Rubio and Casino, 2002). 13 
Type-II contract
If managerial incentives relies on market shares, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of …rm i is the following:
The …rst derivative w.r.t. q i ; under the symmetry condition q i = q (S) for all i, is:
which delivers
After substituting the above expression into (26) and di¤erentiating w.r.t.
S; we have:
In correspondence of the tangency point associated with the nonlinear solution, q (S) = S=n and q 0 (S) = =n; so that (29) can be rewritten as follows:
whose roots are
The smaller solution, S , can be disregarded for two equally relevant reasons.
The …rst is that, if delegation were not adopted (i.e., = 0), S = 0, which does not solve (2) under the assumption of nonlinear feedback strategies. The second, perhaps equally if not more compelling, is that setting = = 0 must yield the solution attained by Lambertini and Mantovani (2014, eq.
(19), p. 119) for pure pro…t-seeking entrepreneurial …rms, which happens only if one takes S + : Accordingly, the steady state equilibrium resource stock under nonlinear feedback rules and managerial incentives based on market shares is
which belongs to R + for all 2 0; b i and > nr:
The above expression exhibits the following property:
for all n > 1; which can be spelled out in the following:
Lemma 4 Under a type-II delegation contract and nonlinear feedback rules, any increase in the extent of delegation decreases the residual stock of resources in steady state, for all 2 0; b i and > nr.
Jointly considering Lemmas 3 and 4 reveals that feedback rules (in this case, nonlinear ones) have opposite implications depending on the incentive scheme being speci…ed by …rms'owners in the contract o¤ered to their managers.
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The results appearing in Lemmata 3-4 have some relevant bearings on the discussion about the so-called voracity e¤ect (see Lane and Tornell, 1996; and Tornell and Lane, 1999) , which can be brie ‡y summarised by saying that, in principle, one would expect that the higher the resource growth rate is, the higher should be volume of that resource in steady state. However, this may not hold true as …rms respond to any increase in the growth rate by hastening resource extraction, whereby one observes that @S=@ < 0 in steady state, at least for su¢ ciently high levels of . The arising of such voracity e¤ect has been highlighted, with pure pro…t-seeking units, in Benchekroun (2008) 
with the expression on the r.h.s. of (34) being higher than nr. Here, the presence of two di¤erent types of managerial delegation has opposite e¤ects also in relation with the voracity e¤ect, since the following holds:
Proposition 5 If delegation is based on the sales volume (as in Vickers, 1985) , then managerial incentives soften the voracity e¤ect, if the latter operates. If instead delegation is based on market shares (as in Ritz, 2008) , then managerial incentives amplify the voracity e¤ect, when the latter is operating, or replace it if it is not present.
It is now worth looking back at the open-loop solution to note that, at the resulting quasi-static Cournot equilibrium, both types of delegation mitigate the voracity e¤ect. Put di¤erently, one could say that a linear delegation scheme softens any underlying voracity e¤ect irrespective of the informational content underpinning …rms'strategies. It is only when nonlinear delegation contracts and more sophisticated rules are adopted that a synergy between delegation and voracity appears. This, indeed, is in line with the acquired wisdom holding that feedback rules make agents more aggressive, each one trying to pre-empt the rivals. 8 A last remark is in order. The foregoing analysis appears to imply that the speci…c design of delegation contracts proposed to managers is of public interest not only for the usual reasons connected with consumer surplus and pro…ts but also for (perhaps more far-reaching) motives dealing with the impact of the separation between ownership and control on resource (and species) preservation.
Concluding remarks
I have investigated the implications of the separation between ownership and control in a di¤erential oligopoly game where …rms exploit a renewable resource over an in…nite horizon. Two alternative structures of the delegation contract have been considered, either à la Vickers (1985) , whereby each manager maximises an objective consisting in a weighted sum of pro…t and output, or pro…ts and market share à la Ritz (2008) .
The foregoing analysis has shown that while under open-loop strategies delegation favours the preservation of the resource in steady state, under nonlinear feedback rules this applies only to linear contracts à la Vickers (1985) , because the e¤ect of delegation in such a case is equivalent to either an increase in market size or a decrease in marginal cost, and therefore any increase in the extent of delegation has a positive impact on the residual volume of the natural resource surviving at the steady state. Conversely, the contract based on market shares appears to exert a negative impact on the same magnitude, acting as a ‡ywheel in an undesirable synergy with the voracity e¤ect originally singled out by Lane and Tornell (1996) . The policy implication stemming from these …ndings is that a public environmental agency should pay the due attention to the internal organization of …rms heavily involved in the exploitation of key resources, when regulating access to such resources.
